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Abstract 
This paper takes stock of the first few years of the functioning of Banking Union by examining the 
politics an asymmetric Banking Union. It first explains why Banking Union was set up in an 
incomplete and asymmetric way. It then explains how and why this has resulted in asymmetric effects, 
beside the original intended effects. It is argued that two competing coalitions mainly driven by 
different economic interests have shaped the configuration of Banking Union and have been 
differently affected by it. The paper also reflects on the disjuncture (meaning, overlap and underlap) of 
competences between levels of governance and supranational–intergovernmental dynamics in Banking 
Union. 
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1. Introduction* 
Banking Union was the main response of the European Union (EU) - to be precise, the euro area - to 
the sovereign crisis in the euro area periphery (Donnelly 2014; De Rynck 2015; Epstein and Rhodes 
2016; Glöcker et al. 2016; Howarth and Quaglia 2016a; Schaeffer 2016; Schimmelfennig 2016). 
Banking Union was supposed to ‘ensure financial stability’ by breaking the ‘doom loop’ between 
banks and sovereigns, elevating the ‘responsibility for supervision to the European level’, and 
providing for ‘common mechanisms to resolve banks and guarantee customer deposits’ (Van Rompuy 
2012). Yet, the Banking Union that was originally envisaged in 2012 is different from the one that was 
eventually set up. This paper explains why and takes stock of the first few years of the functioning of 
Banking Union.  
It is argued that two competing coalitions have shaped the configuration of Banking Union; they 
have been differently affected by it; and they have sought to promote (or hinder) its completion. One 
coalition, led by German policy-makers, has been keen to establish ‘rules’ (mainly, restrictions placed 
on the national authorities), but has been reluctant to set up common mechanisms for financial 
support, pointing out the danger of ‘moral hazard’ and the need to sort out national banking problems 
prior to the completion of Banking Union. The second coalition, led by French policy-makers, with the 
support of policy-makers from Italy and other ‘periphery’ member states, has been eager to establish 
common support mechanisms, but has been reluctant to abide by the new rules set up as part of 
Banking Union. This coalition has criticised the incompleteness of Banking Union with a view to 
setting in place the missing components. The result has been an incomplete and asymmetric Banking 
Union, which has produced asymmetric effects. Moreover, there is a disjuncture (meaning, overlap 
and underlap) of competences between levels of governance in Banking Union: national, euro area and 
EU. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines two competing coalitions, their members, their 
interests and their interactions. Section 3 explains how and why Banking Union was set up in an 
incomplete way: banking supervision was supranationalised by transferring it to the euro area level 
(with some caveats); resolution was supranationalised only to a limited degree, maintaining an 
intergovernmental component, as well as substantial responsibilities at the national level; a common 
deposit guarantee scheme was not set up; and a common fiscal backstop did not materialise. Section 4 
explains how and why an incomplete Banking Union has produced some negative effects, beside the 
original intended effects. In particular, there has been limited harmonisation of bank resolution 
practices amongst the member states and the national authorities seem to be inclined to apply the 
‘Sinatra doctrine’ by dealing with ailing banks in ‘their own ways’. This has produced inconsistencies 
- a patchwork - across Banking Union. Furthermore, Banking Union has weakened the ability of the 
national authorities to deal with ailing banks, without sufficiently strengthening the capability of 
supranational authorities to do so. 
2. Competing coalitions in Banking Union 
This paper analyses the setting up and the functioning of Banking Union by taking an 
intergovernmental perspective, albeit considering also the role of supranational actors. Accounts that 
focus (not exclusively) on the preferences and the influence of the member states have been used to 
explain the construction of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) (e.g.Dyson and Featherstone 1999, 
Moravcsik 1998), the functioning of EMU (e.g. Dyson 2000, Dyson 2008), the response to the 
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sovereign debt crisis in the euro area (Fabbrini 2013; Schimmelfennig 2015), and the construction of 
Banking Union (Howarth and Quaglia 2016a). More generally, recent literature has pointed out the 
trend towards the ‘new intergovernmentalism’ in the EU (Bickerton, Hodson, Puetter 2015), albeit 
with considerable variations across policy areas. With reference to recent EU crises, Jones et al. (2016) 
have argued that intergovernmental bargaining leads to incomplete solutions based on the ‘lowest 
common denominator’, which deepen integration, but lay the seeds for subsequent crises in the EU. 
Over time, a new crisis builds up and the member states respond to it with solutions based on the 
lowest common denominator.  
Building on this literature, this paper identifies two competing coalitions of member states that 
shared similar economic interests and articulated similar views concerning Banking Union. The 
arguments put forward by the two coalitions reflected long-standing debates between ‘creditors’ and 
‘debtors’ countries in the EU (or ‘saints’ and ‘sinners’ as Dyson 2014 puts it). The interests of the 
member states had mostly to do with their fiscal positions, but also the overall ‘health’ of their national 
banking systems. Supranational actors, specifically, the European Commission and the European 
Central Bank (ECB), were instrumental in the construction of Banking Union (Epstein and Rhodes 
2016) and favoured the supranationalisation of all its components, meaning the transfer of supervision, 
resolution and deposit protection from the national level to the Banking Union level. However, these 
supranational bodies were aware of what was (or not) politically feasible and of the need to strike a 
balance between the (different) preferences of the member states. 
The first coalition, which was led by French policy-makers and included policy-makers from Italy 
and other countries in the euro area periphery, advocated the establishment of Banking Union quickly 
in order to deal with the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area periphery, as detailed in the following 
section. Policy-makers in these countries were keen to secure financial support mechanisms for ailing 
banks and sovereigns. In return, they were willing to accept the supranationalisation of banking 
supervision as well as new rules on bank resolution (first and foremost, the bail in). States in the 
periphery of the euro area shared similar interests: they had weak fiscal positions and several ailing 
banks, some of which, especially in Italy, had not been bailed-out during the height of the crisis and 
were subsequently penalised by the low economic growth in the euro area periphery (Hardie and 
Howarth 2013). These banks were interconnected to the rest of the national banking system and held 
considerable amounts of national government bonds, posing the risk of contagion that could 
undermine the confidence in the national banking system and its sovereign. Banking Union was 
therefore seen by policy-makers in the periphery of the euro area as a solution to the ‘doom loop’ 
banks-sovereigns (Veron 2012; Marzinotto et al. 2011). In Banking Union, national policy-makers in 
the periphery faced the issue of dealing with ailing banks within the new framework set up by Banking 
Union, in particular, the rules on private sector burden sharing and the bail-in, as explained in Section 
4. 
A competing coalition, which was led by German policy-makers and included policy-makers in 
Austria, Finland and the Netherlands (the last two with some caveats), was reluctant to set up Banking 
Union, especially mechanisms for financial support to (foreign) ailing banks and their sovereigns. The 
German authorities were particularly concerned about moral hazard - that is to say, not to provide 
incentives for ‘risky’ behaviour of sovereigns and banks - and legacies problems deriving from past 
supervisory forbearance (Schaeffer 2016). This coalition was therefore keen to supranationalise 
banking supervision for systemic banks – an important qualification for Germany and Austria, given 
the dual configuration of their national banking systems - but not resolution (except to a limited 
extent), deposit insurance and a common fiscal backstop (Howarth and Quaglia 2016a), as detailed in 
Section 3. Germany, Austria, Finland and the Netherlands shared similar interests: they had sound 
fiscal positions and were likely to be net contributors to any mechanism for financial support in 
Banking Union. Policy-makers in these countries were therefore keen to prevent moral hazard and to 
minimise the elements of Banking Union that could result in fiscal transfers from fiscally and 
financially stable member states to ailing member states. Moreover, Germany, Austria and to some 
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extent the Netherlands and Finland, bailed out their banks in the aftermath of the international 
financial crisis, hence these banks were in a relatively good shape when Banking Union was set up 
(Hardie and Howarth 2013). In Banking Union, the new rules on resolution, especially the bail-in, 
were (at least on paper) easier to apply in these countries because there were fewer ailing banks, the 
new rules did not affect many retail bonds holders, and national (or associational) deposit guarantee 
schemes protected depositors above 100.000 euros, as elaborated in Section 4.  
Germany was the largest economy in the euro area, it had a large current account surplus and a 
sound fiscal position. For these reasons, German policy-makers enjoyed a kind of veto power in the 
construction of Banking Union (Bulmer 2016; Bulmer and Patterson 2013), although one constrained 
by the threat of sovereign debt default in the euro periphery, contagion and euro area disintegration. 
Indeed, German policy-makers, like policy-makers in other euro area members, were concerned about 
the potential breaking up of the euro (Epstein and Rhodes 2016; Schimmelfennig 2015). As it had 
happened with reference to EMU, the German authorities agreed to Banking Union, but they had a 
strong ‘imprint’ in its construction, which was somewhat a ‘lighter’ version of that initially proposed 
in three main respects: resolution, deposit guarantee and fiscal backstop, as explained in the following 
section. Overall, Banking Union was built in an asymmetric way because different forces pulled in 
somewhat different directions. The effects of the functioning of Banking Union have not brought 
together the two coalitions, and the existing division has been reinforced, as explained in Section 4.  
It is also worth noting an interesting historical parallel between EMU and Banking Union (Howarth 
and Quaglia 2015). Banking Union was the response to a crisis triggered by an incomplete EMU. 
Indeed, the architects of EMU – the central bank governors and expert members of the Committee for 
the study of economic and monetary union under the chairmanship of Commission President Jacques 
Delors – had advocated the transfer of prudential supervision to the supranational level to complement 
monetary union (1989, para. 32). However, the transfer of supervisory powers was postponed given 
the opposition of a number of national governments (Dyson and Featherstone 1999). Furthermore, 
during the negotiations leading to the Maastricht Treaty, some member states, first and foremost 
Germany, opposed a fiscal (or transfer) union for political and economic reasons. Politically, it was 
seen as a step too far, impinging upon a core area of national sovereignty. Economically, member 
states with sound fiscal positions, led by Germany, were concerned by the potential moral hazard that 
a fiscal union would bring about, and that they would end up financing countries that lacked sufficient 
fiscal discipline (Dyson and Featherstone 1999).  
The result was the establishment of an asymmetric EMU, whereby monetary union did not include 
banking supervision and was not coupled by a full economic (fiscal) union (Dyson 2000; Verdun 
1996). By 2012, in the context of a devastating sovereign debt crisis and the very real menace of the 
imminent collapse of the Spanish banking system, Spanish government default and euro area collapse, 
euro area governments agreed to Banking Union. Banking Union was presented as the completion of 
EMU, addressing a fundamental flaw in the design of EMU (Van Rompuy 2012). But even Banking 
Union was incomplete, without a fiscal backstop and a common deposit guarantee scheme.  
3. The making of an incomplete Banking Union (2012-14)1 
In June 2012, the President of the European Council, the President of the Eurogroup, the President of 
the Commission and the President of the ECB, presented an interim report titled ‘Towards a Genuine 
Economic and Monetary Union’. The Van Rompuy (2012) report, which was also known as the Four 
Presidents Report, proposed what later became known as Banking Union. The project of Banking 
Union was subsequently endorsed by the European Council and the euro area summit in June 2012. 
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The main objective of Banking Union was to break the ‘vicious circle’ between ailing banks and 
struggling sovereigns (Allen at al. 2013; Pisani-Ferry 2012).  
The main supporters of Banking Union were policy-makers in the member states in the euro area 
periphery, first and foremost Spain and Italy, which were hit by the sovereign debt crisis (Financial 
Times, 5 December 2012). French policy-makers were worried by the fact that French banks were 
heavily exposed in Southern Europe and France would have been the next country, after Italy, to be at 
risk of financial contagion. Policy-makers in these countries pointed out the need to move quickly to 
Banking Union. By contrast, German policy-makers argued that timing was not the essence and that it 
was instead important to get the right institutional arrangements in place (Financial Times, 6 
December 2012). British policy-makers, given the fact that the UK was not part of the single currency 
and had a very internationalised rather than ‘Europeanised’ banking system, lacked an incentive to 
join Banking Union. The UK by and large supported the Banking Union project, but declared at the 
outset that it would not be part of it. For example, in the summer of 2011, the British Chancellor 
Osborne called for ‘permanent changes’ to stabilise the euro area in the medium and long term 
(Financial Times, 20 July 2011), arguing that there was a ‘remorseless logic’ for a banking and fiscal 
union in the euro area.  
The ECB-centric SSM 
The first component of Banking Union to be set up was the SSM (Alexander 2015; Ferran and Babis 
2013; Salines et al. 2011). The final agreement reached at the December 2012 European Council 
foresaw that the ECB would be ‘responsible for the overall effective functioning of the SSM’ and 
would have ‘direct oversight of the euro area banks’. This supervision, however, would be 
‘differentiated’ and the ECB would carry it out in ‘close cooperation with national supervisory 
authorities’. The regulation establishing the SSM also permitted the ECB to step in, if necessary, and 
supervise any of the 6000 banks in the euro area. The SSM applied only to the euro area member 
states and to the non-euro area member states that decide to join Banking Union.  
The SSM eventually agreed involved a compromise on the distribution of supervisory power 
between the ECB and the national competent authorities. Direct ECB supervision – through joint 
supervisory teams – was to cover only those banks with assets exceeding €30 billion or those whose 
asset represented at least 20 per cent of their home country’s annual GDP. The thousands of smaller, 
so-called ‘less significant’ banks headquartered in the euro area would continue to be under the direct 
supervision of the national competent authorities, but according to increasingly harmonised rules and 
practices. This compromise of two-level supervision reflected above all the demands of the German 
government, which opposed transferring supervisory responsibilities for the country’s regional public 
savings banks (Sparkassen) and co-operatives to the ECB (Howarth and Quaglia 2016b). 
The ‘hybrid’ SRM  
In July 2013, the Commission proposed the establishment of the SRM, designed to complement the 
SSM (Veron and Wolf 2013). Most of the negotiations concerned the decision-making process in the 
SSM and the establishment of the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) financed by bank levies raised at the 
national level. The Commission, supported by French, Spanish and Italian policy-makers, wanted to 
be given the final power to decide whether to place a bank into resolution and determine the 
application of resolution tools. However, German policy-makers argued that the Single Resolution 
Board (SRB) should be given this power and insisted on setting up the SRF through an 
intergovernmental agreement among the participating member states (Financial Times, 8 November 
2013.).  
The ECB argued that the SRM was ‘a necessary complement to the SSM, as the levels of 
responsibility and decision-making for resolution and supervision have to be aligned’ (ECB 2013, p. 
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3). In November 2013, the ECB issued a 32-page opinion that the SRB should be, from the start, a 
single ‘strong and independent’ body, thus directly challenging the German position that the SRM 
should begin as a network of national authorities (Financial Times, 8 November 2013). Along similar 
lines, Michel Barnier, the EU Commissioner responsible for financial services, pointed out that ‘we 
are building is a single system and not a multi-storey intergovernmental network (The Telegraph, 18 
December 2013). 
In March 2014, an agreement was reached on the establishment of the SRM. As advocated by 
German policy-makers, the SRB would be responsible for the planning and resolution of cross-border 
banks and those directly supervised by the ECB, while national resolution authorities would be 
responsible for all other banks, except if a bank required access to the SRF. Moreover, the SRF, 
financed by bank levies raised at national level, would initially consist of national compartments that 
would be gradually merged over eight years (Alexander 2015). The SRM regulation was adopted in 
conjunction with the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), which harmonised resolution 
instruments and powers in the EU. The BRRD and the SRM regulation introduced a new instrument in 
bank resolution, the bail-in, which reduced substantially the need for public funding to bail out banks 
(Nielsen and Smeets 2017). Thus, the SRM would be ‘fiscally neutral’ (Eurogroup and Ecofin 2013, p. 
1). German policy-makers, supported by the Dutch, Austrian and Finnish policy-makers, insisted on 
an earlier entry into force of the bail-in than the originally envisaged date in 2018. The start date was 
eventually moved forward to 2016 (The Economist, 14 December 2013). 
The position of the German authorities needs to be elaborated further (see also Donnelly 2014; 
Epstein and Rhodes 2016; Schäffer 2016). Before the proposal for Banking Union was put forward, 
German policy-makers had repeatedly pointed out the need to have the responsibility for supervision 
and resolution at the same level of governance, so as to avoid moral hazard. In other words, they 
opposed the idea of pooling national financial resources at the euro area level to pay for the resolution 
of banks across the euro area that were not subject to common supervision. However, once the SSM 
was agreed, the German authorities remained reluctant to supranationalise bank resolution for fear of 
past national supervisory forbearance and the legacy problems plaguing national banking systems. 
Furthermore, German policy-makers — joined with the Austrian, Dutch and Finns — insisted that the 
funds of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) could not be used to cover legacy problems, to be 
revealed by a comprehensive assessment of euro area banks by the ECB (Howarth and Quaglia 
2016a), as elaborated below.  
The missing EDIS  
The missing component of Banking Union was what later became to be known as the European 
Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) (see Gros and Schoenmaker 2014). In June 2012, the interim Van 
Rompuy (Four Presidents) report mentioned the need to set up a EDIS. According to the Financial 
Times (13 September 2012), the Commission had prepared a draft proposing a new agency, the 
European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Authority (EDIRA), which would control a new European 
Deposit Guarantee and Resolution Fund. Due to German opposition, the proposal for the EDIRA was 
removed from the final Commission document ‘A Roadmap Towards Banking Union’ (Financial 
Times, 13 September 2012). Hence, the final Van Rompuy report issued in December 2012 only made 
reference to the ‘Agreement on the harmonisation of national resolution and deposit guarantee 
frameworks, ensuring appropriate funding from the financial industry’ (Van Rompuy 2012, p. 4).  
German policy-makers criticised a EDIS as an unacceptable step towards debt mutualisation. The 
coalition agreement between the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the Christian Social Union 
(CSU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) explicitly rejected the idea (Koalitionsvertrag 2013: 
94). German banking associations and individual banks feared that a EDIS would impinge upon their 
sectoral institutional protection schemes (Handelsblatt, 7 November 2012). Moreover, German banks 
feared that they would likely become net contributors to a EDIS — bailing out depositors in other euro 
Lucia Quaglia 
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area member states. By contrast, policy-makers in France and in the euro area periphery regarded the 
EDIS as the final pillar of Banking Union, necessary to severe the doom loop between banks and 
sovereigns (Reuters, 11 September 2015). For example, the Italian authorities repeatedly pointed out 
that ‘coherence is needed between the centralisation of supervision and the management of financial 
difficulties’ (Szego 2013: 7, authors’ translation). The ECB regarded the EDIS as an important 
component of Banking Union, but one that could be implemented at a later date, as pointed out by 
ECB Vice President Vitor Constâncio (2014).  
The issue came back on the policy agenda in June 2015, when EU leaders — including ECB 
president Mario Draghi and Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker — endorsed the creation of 
the EDIS in the so-called ‘Five Presidents’ Report’ on the future of the euro. In the autumn of 2015, 
the Commission proposed the EDIS for bank deposits in the euro area as ‘the third pillar of the 
Banking Union’ (Commission 2015). The Commission proposal would, as a first step, involve the 
establishment of a mandatory ‘reinsurance’ scheme that would ‘contribute under certain conditions 
when national deposit guarantee schemes are called upon’, thus in effect act as a backstop to national 
deposit guarantee schemes (Commission 2015).  
This initiative took place despite explicit German opposition. The German finance minister, 
Wolfgang Schäuble argued that there was a ‘moral hazard problem’: ‘as soon as you share risk, the 
decisiveness to reduce risk is lessened’ (Financial Times, 8 December 2015). His concern was that 
‘German taxpayers’ will have to ‘foot the bill’ (Financial Times, 10 September 2015). German policy-
makers also had good reason to fear that a number of member states would have difficulty meeting the 
target level for ex ante contributions from banks to national deposit guarantee schemes agreed in the 
2014 revised directive (Howarth and Quaglia 2016a). As in the case of the creation of the SRF, the 
discussion on the creation of a EDIS pitted countries expected to make net contributions to common 
rescue funds — either from taxpayers or from banks — against those that expected to be the principal 
recipients (Donnelly 2014). In order to make progress on the EDIS and overcome German opposition, 
the European Commission proposed that savings and cooperative banks be exempted from having to 
contribute to the EDIS (Reuters, 2 November 2015).  
The lack of a common fiscal backstop 
Finally, the credibility of the SRM/SRF and the EDIS was linked to the possibility of accessing a 
common fiscal backstop. Given unanimity rules on the use of the ESM, German policy-makers 
enjoyed a veto on any decision to engage in direct bank recapitalization. Under the rules established 
for the direct recapitalization of banks, euro area member states agreed that a bank’s creditors should 
absorb ‘appropriate’ losses before ESM funds could be accessed. These appropriate losses were 
defined by the BRRD’s rules on the bail in. Moreover, ESM rules required a bank’s home government 
to contribute at least twenty per cent of the recapitalization (initially) and then ten per cent from 2017. 
German policy-makers — joined by the Austrian, Dutch and Finns — insisted that ESM funds could 
not be used to cover legacy problems. Hence, the fiscal backstop did not materialize. However, as 
noted by the ECB’s Executive Board member Peter Praet (2016) ‘In the future it will be necessary to 
create a common fiscal backstop to ensure that the SRF has sufficient resources to support the 
resolution measures taken by the Single Resolution Board’. 
Overall, Banking Union was set up in timely fashion between 2012 and 2014. However, it was 
incomplete and asymmetric in three main respects. First, member states governments retained their 
vetoes on the mutualisation of national funds and an important say on the use of resolution funds in the 
SRM. A rather ‘complex’ compromise was reached concerning the resolution process in the SRB. 
Moreover, resolution mostly remained a national matter. De facto, the SRB has so far resolved only 
one bank. Second, the EDIS was not set up. Third, no common fiscal backstop was established.  
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4. The functioning and the effects of an asymmetric Banking Union 
In the short term, the setting up of Banking Union – together with the pledge of the ECB to ‘do 
whatever it takes to save the euro’ - were successful in stopping the sovereign debt crisis in the euro 
periphery. In 2014, three SSM milestones were reached. First, the ECB published a list of 128 banks 
subject to direct ECB supervision. The thousands of smaller, so-called ‘less significant’ banks 
headquartered in the euro area would continue to be under the direct supervision of the national 
competent authorities, according to increasingly harmonised rules and practices. Second, the ECB 
endorsed the SSM Supervisory Manual and published a Guide to Banking Supervision, which had 
been drawn up by a task force consisting of ECB staff and experts from the national competent 
authorities (ECB 2014a). Third, the ECB published its comprehensive assessment of the banks subject 
to its direct supervision (ECB 2014b). This comprehensive assessment consisted of the ECB’s assets 
quality review (AQR) and the EBA’s stress tests. 
The AQR involved over 6000 ECB and national competent authorities officials reviewing 800 
portfolios, amounting to more than 57 per cent of the risk-weighted assets of the 128 banks examined 
(see Gren et al. 2015 for further details). Crucially, the AQR significantly improved the transparency 
and comparability of bank data across the then 18 euro area Member States plus Lithuania (which 
joined at the start of 2015). The AQR harmonised the definition of non-performing loans and 
uncovered hidden losses. In doing so, the ECB found massive shortfalls – €136 billion – in the loans 
that banks and national regulators classified as non-performing (i.e. bad). This figure amounted to 15 
per cent more than the total previously announced by the national competent authorities. As for the 
EBA’s stress test, 24 banks failed with a capital shortfall under the adverse scenario of €24.6 billion. 
Amongst the 24 (14 after earlier capital-raising in 2014) banks that failed the comprehensive 
assessment Italian and Greek banks were the most exposed, with, respectively, nine and four failing, 
followed by three Austrian banks and two each from Cyprus, Slovenia and Spain. A Portuguese bank 
failed the tests later on. Italian banks, which were responsible for a quarter of the total over-valued 
assets, were hit particularly hard by the harmonised definition of nonperforming loans. 
Overall, the harmonisation of rules and practices in supervision has taken place in Banking Union 
(see Gren et al. 2015). One of the first priorities of the Supervisory Board of the SSM has been to 
promote the harmonised implementation of options and national discretions in the EU banking rule 
book, so as to create a level playing field in the euro area (Praet 2016). It is an ongoing process that 
has started by focusing on significant banks, whereas divergence in the supervision of less significant 
banks at the national level will continue in the immediate future, given very different national 
institutional and regulatory frameworks. However, harmonisation will gradually take placefor these 
small banks.  
The SRB was set up as an EU agency in 2015 and so far it has resolved one bank. In December 
2014, the Council of Ministers reached a political agreement on the implementing Regulation 
determining the contributions to be paid by banks to the SRF (Council 2014), whereby banks in 
France and Germany, the two biggest euro area economies, would contribute the bulk of the SRF's 
financial resources (€55 billions), followed by Italy, the third biggest euro area economy (Reuters, 18 
December 2014). Smaller banks — broadly defined as those with total assets of up to €1 billion — 
would pay a lower flat contribution rate.  
Despite the functioning of the SRM and the entry into force of the BRRD, resolution practices in 
the member states have continued to differ in Banking Union. Indeed, there has been a considerable 
variation in the way in which the national authorities have dealt with ailing banks, in particular 
concerning the important question of ‘who pays’ (Mayes 2004). In certain cases, such as Austria and 
Greece, subordinated and senior creditors were bailed-in, with some compensation concerning the 
state guarantee in Austria. In other cases, such as Portugal, selected senior (foreign) creditors were 
bailed-in. In Spain, the SRB intervened for the first time to resolve a bank that was later taken over by 
a larger bank. In Italy, there was a gamut of cases: subordinated creditors were bailed-in and some 
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retail investors were then partly compensated by the state; healthy banks were involved in a private 
sector bail-out orchestrated by the public authorities; precautionary recapitalisation was used to get 
around the bail-in and to avoid the SRB’s involvement; finally banks were liquidated by the national 
authorities according to national law, and were later acquired by a larger bank.  
The following is a bird’s eye view of the main cases of resolution that have taken place in Banking 
Union. In Austria, the HETA was resolved between 2015 and 2016 with the full bail-in of subordinated 
debt, the bail-in of senior debt with an haircut of 54%, and an out of court settlement by the Carinthia 
Compensation Payment Fund to partly compensate creditors whose bonds were covered by state 
guarantees. The State of Carinthia and the Austrian government contributed to the Compensation 
Fund. In Greece, the Panellinia Bank was resolved in 2015 by transferring selected assets and 
liabilities to Piraeus Bank. The equities were bailed-in, and there was no outstanding subordinated 
debt at that time. In the resolution of the Cooperative Bank of Peloponnese, shareholders and 
remaining liabilities were bailed-in, and deposits were transferred to the National Bank of Greece by 
using the Greek resolution fund (World Bank 2016).  
In Portugal, the resolution of Novo Banco (former Banco Espiritu Santo), involved the selective 
bail-in of some of senior (foreign) creditors for approximately €2 billion. Although Novo Banco had 
about €5.4 billion of senior debt, only 5 tranches of it, mostly held by institutional investors, were 
wiped out, triggering a set of legal proceedings initiated by the creditors hit by the bail in (World Bank 
2016). In Spain, the rural bank Bantierra received financial support in 2012, 2013 and 2015 from the 
insolvency fund of the Spanish Association of Rural Banks, which is the largest cooperative group in 
Spain. In March 2017, Bantierra received a further capital injection of €328 million from the 
Association, while the Banco de Espana considered a solution similar to the Atlas fund set up in Italy 
and discussed below (El Mundo, 5 March 2017). In June 2017, the ailing Banco Mare Nostrum, which 
was state owned, following the bail-out and merger of several cajas, was acquired by Bankia, which 
was the biggest bank in Spain, resulting from the mergers of several cajas that had been bailed-out 
(Reuters, 27 June 2017). In July 2017, the SRB resolved the Banco Popular: shareholders and 
bondholders suffered losses and the bank was later acquired by Santander for a relatively low price. In 
the deal, Santander benefitted from tax exemptions granted by the Spanish authorities. A 
compensation scheme in the form of new bonds was offered to retail investors who had bought shares 
and subordinated bonds of the Banco Popular (Global Capital, 18 July 2017).  
In Italy, four small banks (Banca Marche, Cassa di risparmio di Ferrara, Popolare Etruria e 
CariChieti), were resolved in late 2015. Junior subordinated creditors were bailed-in and later some 
retail investors were partly compensated by the state. In early 2016, a state guarantee scheme on 
banks’ non-performing loans was set up, and a new state-sponsored bank-financed fund (Atlas 1) was 
created to buy tranches of non- performing loans. Atlas also acted as the underwriter of last resort for 
the precautionary recapitalisation undertaken by two ailing banks in the Veneto region, which had 
failed the ECB’s comprehensive assessment (Sole 24 Ore, 8 April 2016). In the summer of 2017, the 
fund Atlas 2 was set up to help dealing with the problems of the Monte dei Paschi di Siena, which had 
been the largest bank to fail the ECB’s comprehensive assessment. Eventually the preventive 
recapitalisation of the MPS with public money was carried out in June 2017, accompanied by burden 
sharing for shareholders and junior debt holders, with some compensation for retail investors. In June 
2017, the two ailing banks of the Veneto region, which were under the direct supervision of the ECB 
in SSM, were declared no longer viable. The SRB decided not to intervene and these banks were 
liquidated by the Italian authorise according to the Italian insolvency law. The Italian authorities de 
facto avoided or side-stepped the application of the new EU rules prohibiting the bail out and 
prescribing the bail in.  
Three main reflections concerning the effects of an incomplete and asymmetric Banking Union are 
in order. First, the Sinatra doctrine in dealing with ailing banks was a political necessity, given the 
political salience of bank resolution and the different configurations of national banking systems. In 
Italy, many junior and senior bank bonds were hold by retailers - this made the bail very difficult from 
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a political point of view. Yet, the BRRD and SRM were supposed to harmonise national frameworks 
and practices concerning bank resolution. The current ‘patchwork’ has implications for the levelled 
playing field for banks and their creditors (including bond holders and depositors) across countries. It 
is also potentially detrimental to financial stability, given the difficulty of resolving effectively and in 
a timely manner cross-border banks, if national specificities persist.  
Second, the supranationalisation of only one component of Banking Union, namely, supervision, 
the partial supranationalisation of resolution, as well as the absence of the EDIS and the common 
fiscal backstop, have produced negative effects in the euro area periphery. Although the problems of 
ailing banks mostly resulted from past legacies and would have existed within or without Banking 
Union, the ECB-led supervision in the SSM exposed these banking problems more starkly. A clear 
example was the ECB’s comprehensive assessment, which highlighted that several banks suffered 
from non-performing loans. Whereas in the past, national supervisory forbearance was a common 
practice, this was no longer possible under the supervision of the ECB in the SSM. In certain cases, 
such as the Monte dei Paschi di Siena, the viability of the bank was at risk. Bank resolution remained 
to a large extent a national matter, but it was complicated by an incomplete Banking Union. German 
policy-makers would argue that a larger SRF, the EDIS and the fiscal backstop are not necessary, 
given the bail-in rules, which are supposed to reduce the need for common rescue funds — either from 
taxpayers or banks — to deal with ailing banks. However, the bail-in is often politically controversial 
and judicially contested, especially if retail investors are affected (as in the case of Italy), or creditors 
are selectively bailed-in (as in Portugal), or there are state guarantees (as in the Austrian case).  
Moreover, the bail-in of bank creditors could have contagion effects, triggering the doom loop in 
the periphery. Indeed, an incomplete Banking Union has revealed the structural difficulty of breaking 
the ‘doom loop’ in the euro area periphery. Following the entry into force of the bail-in rules and 
given the fact that in the euro area periphery the debt of ailing banks was mostly owned by financial 
institutions and in some cases retail investors in the same country, there was the danger of contagion 
effects within national banking systems. Furthermore, banks in the euro area periphery also had 
considerable amount of public debt of their national government on their balance sheets, hence there 
was the risk of re-igniting the doom loop that Banking Union was supposed to stop.  
Third, an incomplete Banking Union seems to make more difficult - to be precise, more time-
consuming, less cost-effective for the public finances and the private sector, and more socially 
disruptive - to deal with banking crises or the failures of individual banks. This is because some 
competences no longer belong to the national authorities, they have been transferred to different 
authorities at the euro area level (the ECB-SSM and the SRB) and EU level (the Commission) – these 
authorities sometimes act in a poorly coordinated way. In a nutshell, the ECB decides whether a bank 
under its direct supervision is ‘failing or likely to fail’. The SRB is in charge of resolving banks whose 
resolution is in the ‘public interest’. Other failing banks are liquidated by the national authorities 
according to national law. The Commission monitors the use of state aid, its effects on competition as 
well as the application of rules on private sector burden-sharing. Yet, the political responsibility for 
ailing banks remains at the national level, and so does the fiscal capacity to bail out banks, subject to 
EU rules.  
In practice, there is a misalignment of competences and incentives between authorities and levels 
of governance in Banking Union. There seems to be a power vacuum that de facto strengthens big 
(solid) banks, making them pivotal players in order to deal with other ailing banks in the system. 
Intesa in Italy and Santander in Spain were the most notable examples. This happens because big 
(solid) banks have considerable financial firepower, partly as a consequence of Banking Union and 
financial integration in the EU more generally. At the same time, the national authorities are weaker - 
they have fewer powers and competences - following the setting up of Banking Union. Yet, the EU 
authorities have not been sufficiently strengthened to compensate for the competences lost by the 
public authorities at the national level. Timely coordination concerning the management of ailing 
banks is already difficult at the national level because different authorities with different incentives are 
Lucia Quaglia 
10 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers 
involved. The process is even more difficult when powers and competences are split across levels of 
governance, but the political responsibility mostly remains national.  
As pointed out by the ECB’s Executive Board member Praet (2017) ‘While supervisory decisions 
are taken at European level, the relevant risk-sharing mechanisms such as deposit insurance schemes 
are still at national level. Supervision is common, but the consequences of potential bank failures are 
still predominantly national…Both supervisory responsibility and the fiscal backstop need to be at 
European level, to underpin durably confidence in the area-wide financial system…. For the same 
reason, it will also be necessary the establishment of a EDIS, with a credible backstop’. The most 
penalised by the disjuncture deriving from an incomplete Banking Union and the most affected by its 
undesirable effects mentioned above are countries in the periphery of the EU, which have several 
ailing banks as well as banking systems in a bad shape. Hence, a coalition led by policy-makers in 
France, Italy (which, given its banking problems, has been very vocal on this, see Politico, 2 October 
2016, Euronews, 5 May 2016, Rossi 2016, Visco 2016) and Spain has called for the completion of 
Banking Union, with some support from the Commission and the ECB. Yet, some of these countries, 
notably, Italy, have side-stepped the rules of Banking Union, making the concerns of German policy-
makers more justifiable and the completion of Banking Union more difficult.  
Conclusion 
Banking Union was a radical initiative to stabilise euro-periphery national banking systems exposed 
directly to rising sovereign debt loads and the growing risk of default – the ‘sovereign debt-bank doom 
loop’ – and to reverse the fragmentation of European financial markets. Banking Union was supposed 
to set in place a ‘risk-sharing framework for the member states, which would allow costs of resolution 
to be spread across the euro area, contributing to breaking the bank-sovereign doom loop’ (Draghi 
2014). In the short term, Banking Union succeeded in stopping the sovereign debt crisis in the euro 
area, even though the doom loop was not severed and financial fragmentation across the member 
states remained. In the medium term, the incomplete Banking Union had asymmetric effects, 
promoting the supranationalisation of supervision, but not of resolution and deposit insurance. 
Consequently, in Banking Union there has been a limited convergence of resolution practices across 
countries – a sort of Sinatra doctrine in dealing with ailing banks – as well as limited risk-sharing 
arrangements. The asymmetric Banking Union and its effects pose considerable economic and 
political risks to the project. However, different national interests and political sensitivities hinder 
progress towards a full Banking Union, making for a ‘bumpy road’ ahead. 
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